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Abstract 
This Essay reexamines the responsibility to protect (“R2P”) from the perspective of states called to 
intervene—explaining the novelty of a third-party duty to help people in other states and the 
insufficiency of justifications offered for this moral responsibility.  The Essay concludes that R2P will 
ultimately be defined by states contemplating intervention, in part because there are no agreed 
standards for responsibility and the doctrine has various triggering conditions that must be assessed by 
states, including the seriousness of the humanitarian crimes and the proportionality of any response. 
Moreover, domestic bureaucratic competition and conflict may make it difficult for a state to make a 
decision to intervene on primarily humanitarian grounds. 
Keywords 
Responsibility to protect, humanitarian intervention, R2P, moral duty, genocide, crimes against 
humanity
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“There can be no political morality without prudence; that is without consideration of the political 
consequences of seemingly moral action. … Ethics in the abstract judges action by its conformity 
with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its political consequences.”1 
Introduction* 
Faced with impending humanitarian crisis in Libya, President Obama said that the United States had a 
“responsibility to act”2 to prevent the slaughter of civilians by Moammar Qaddafi’s forces. The call 
for responsibility—Qaddafi’s failed responsibility to his own people and the international 
responsibility of other states to respond to humanitarian crimes—makes it timely to assess critically 
the concept of responsibility to protect (“R2P”). In particular, this Essay reexamines R2P from the 
perspective of the intervening state, as opposed to of the failing state and its victimized people. 
When victims in one state—People V (victims of human rights violations) request help not from 
their own State V, but rather another State R (a responsible state), they make a positive claim for 
assistance and rescue from the failures of their own government.3 Nearly all of the literature on R2P 
emphasizes the rights of People V and the sovereign rights of State V, and whether State R has a legal 
right to intervene.4 Many articles and books seek to explain why serious human rights violations 
diminish State V’s right to non-intervention or diminish other requirements of international law. Yet 
this glosses over a harder question about R2P, which is not whether such intervention is permissible, 
but whether states have a responsibility to help people in other states, and if so, whether they will act 
on it. As Thomas Pogge has said, it is not international law that prevents humanitarian interventions, 
but rather the lack of will to commit resources for the benefit of others.5  
This Essay rethinks the meaning of responsibility for states called to intervene—explaining the 
novelty of a third-party duty to help people in other states and the insufficiency of justifications 
offered for this moral responsibility. Despite the assertion of moral responsibility, intervention remains 
                                                     
1 HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 10 (1955). 
* This Essay benefitted from the comments of Robert Chesney, David Luban, Mark Moller, David Schleicher, Elina 
Treyger, Rachel VanLandingham, Stephen Vladeck, and participants at the National Security Law Workshop and the 
George Mason Levy Workshop. 
2 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya, March 28, 2011, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya (“For generations, the 
United States of America has played a unique role as an anchor of global security and as an advocate for human freedom. 
Mindful of the risks and costs of military action, we are naturally reluctant to use force to solve the world’s many 
challenges. That’s what happened in Libya over the course of these last six weeks.”). 
3 For ease of reference, throughout this paper I will refer to the victims of human rights violations as People V living in 
State V, which is either violating the rights of its people or standing by while private actors and groups violate human 
rights. State R refers to a state considering whether and how to fulfill a responsibility to protect People V. 
4 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and change in the law of humanitarian intervention, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 204 (identifying a conundrum between the requirements of 
international law and the moral obligations of intervention and discussing and suggesting that intervention is illegal but 
may be excused) (J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane eds. 2003); Richard B. Bilder, The Implications of Kosovo for 
International Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE 178 (Philip Alston & Euan 
MacDonald eds. 2008) (calling for a careful consideration of the legaility and consequences of the “new interventionism” 
and suggesting that action in humanitarian crises requires new “doctrines and modalities”); Sir Adam Roberts, The 
United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
(Jennifer M. Walsh ed., 2004) (discussing the conflict between humanitarian intervention and the UN Charter).  
5 Thomas Pogge, Moralizing Humanitarian Intervention: Why Jurying Fails and How Law Can Work, in Humanitarian 
Intervention, NOMOS XLVII p. 116 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. Williams, eds.) (“The question is not: What additional 
human suffering the United States and its allies could avert if international law gave them a freer hand to use military 
force abroad? Rather the correct question is: What additional human suffering would the United States and other states 
avert and produce if international law gave them a freer hand to use military force abroad?”).  
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a choice of states. Although I highlight the insufficiency of R2P, at the outset I should emphasize that I 
do not question the moral seriousness of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other triggering conditions for 
R2P. Nor do I question the need or desirability of states intervening for humanitarian purposes. Rather, 
if serious crimes require some State R to help People V, there must be some firm foundation for this 
requirement. R2P has not created an obligation of states to help people in other states. Instead, 
intervention continues to turn on the judgment and choices of states called to intervene. 
Part I begins by providing background about the responsibility to protect, explaining briefly the 
history and basic principle of R2P, which is that each state has a responsibility to protect its population 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. When states fail in this 
responsibility the international community has a responsibility to protect people from these serious 
human rights violations. 
Part II considers in more detail the implications of sovereignty as responsibility. Responsibility of a 
state for its own people is a familiar aspect of the basic relationship between the government and the 
governed—a very minimal duty to protect persons from genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity. Yet what creates a responsibility for State R to assist People V? When State V fails in its 
responsibilities, where does the duty arise for other states to step in? Even more problematic, where 
does the duty of a particular State R arise? The responsibility of one state to people in another state 
raises different issues than the responsibility of a state to its own people. I evaluate some of the 
justifications offered for the responsibility of State R to provide diplomatic, financial, and military 
support to People V. Although a number of scholars have sought to posit a duty, whether perfect or 
imperfect, they fail to explain why State R must protect People V. Consequentialist arguments for 
responsibility are more honest about the trade-offs, but they raise difficult questions about how a state 
must determine what best promotes human security. Once a state is balancing various interests, it is 
difficult to find a principled reason to exclude some interests, particularly those closer to home. In 
addition, in this context People V make a positive claim for assistance from State R, yet even the 
strongest proponents of a responsibility to protect cannot say precisely what State R must do to ensure 
that People V’s rights are respected. The positive right to protect remains highly contingent on a 
number of factors unrelated to the seriousness of the human rights violations. 
Part III examines a neglected principle of international law—the neutral rights of State R. Much of 
the literature on R2P focuses on the sovereign rights of State V and considers whether intervention is 
legally permissible—that is, whether State R can overcome the principle of non-intervention or the 
limits on the use of force in the UN Charter for humanitarian purposes. Yet there is virtually no 
attention to the sovereign rights of State R, in particular whether State R can assert neutrality in this 
context and whether the asserted “responsibility” overcomes neutrality rights. Even though some 
consider neutrality an outmoded concept, it still persists, as it has in some form or another for 
hundreds of years. More attention needs to be given to neutrality because it is grounded in many of the 
same principles as non-intervention, including state sovereignty and the international interest in 
avoiding escalation of armed conflict. Yet the rationales that diminish the sovereign rights of State 
V—its culpability for human rights violations or ineffectiveness in the face of such violations—does 
not support imposing a duty on a neutral state that has committed no wrongdoing. The positive 
obligation of a neutral state to intervene or to assist others must rest on different justifications and yet 
supporters of R2P have largely overlooked this question. Although a comprehensive consideration of 
neutrality and R2P is outside the scope of this Essay, I suggest neutrality poses some difficult 
questions about the possibility of a true responsibility of states to intervene on behalf of victims in 
other states.  
Part IV explains why the responsibility to protect ultimately will be defined by the state 
contemplating intervention. The standards of responsibility are open-ended and there are no agreed 
institutions for judging what responsibility exists in any circumstance. The UN Security Council has 
failed to establish a consistent benchmark for responsibility that can provide a principled distinction to 
explain, for example, why invention in Libya but not Syria. Moreover, even accepting basic principles 
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of a responsibility to protect, the doctrine has a number of limitations, including triggering conditions 
that must be assessed by states, such as whether the crimes are serious and widespread enough to 
warrant intervention; what intervention would be proportionate; and whether a state has sufficient 
capacity for intervention. Whatever the moral obligation of states, states will necessarily assess 
responsibility from their own perspective. 
Finally, Part V analyzes how states might make decisions about intervention to protect individuals 
in other states by considering the domestic processes for making the legal and policy determinations 
leading to intervention. I focus on the domestic agencies in the United States as an example of the 
difficulty of reaching a decision to intervene on primarily humanitarian grounds. Drawing from my 
previous work on international law decision making in the executive branch,6 I argue that executive 
branch agencies assessing the responsibility to protect will often reach different conclusions about the 
requirements for intervention under domestic law. Moreover, bureaucratic competition and failures of 
coordination will make it difficult for the state or even the unitary executive branch to behave as a 
moral agent. Agencies will assess the factors relevant for intervention from their own perspectives. 
Public choice explains why agency officials seek to retain discretion to distinguish one humanitarian 
crisis from another. Agencies must compete for control over international policy and in this 
environment they will have strong incentives to maintain flexibility with regard to the standards for 
humanitarian intervention. A precedent that hardened into specific criteria would remove the 
flexibility that reflects the long-term interest of agencies and also the states of which they are a part. 
Although administrative processes and legal requirements will differ from state to state, most 
governments will face difficulties of bureaucratic coordination and this is something that needs further 
research and attention for those who would like to entrench a responsibility to protect. 
I. The Responsibility to Protect  
This Part briefly explains the development of the responsibility to protect. In the past few decades, 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes has proved controversial both when it happened, such 
as in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and when it failed to happen in places like Rwanda and Sudan.7 In 
response to these challenges, the international community has sought to articulate and implement 
standards for intervention by positing a responsibility to protect. Under this doctrine, states have a 
primary responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity. If they cannot provide such protection or refuse to do so, other nations acting 
through the United Nations may intervene to provide humanitarian assistance, by military means if 
necessary.  
The foundational and aspirational document for this doctrine is a 2001 Report on Responsibility to 
Protect8 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Several years 
later, Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, commissioned a High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change to assess current threats to international peace and security. This so-
called High-Level Panel produced a 2005 Report dealing with the shared responsibility for a secure 
world.9 These reports together set out the basic principles and justifications for R2P. 
                                                     
6 See Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive Branch is a They Not an It, 96 MINN. 
L. REV. 194 (2011). 
7 Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty Foreword 
(December 2001). 
8 Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ¶ 1.34 
(December 2001). 
9 A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
(2005). 
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The interest in R2P generated several actions within the United Nations. In October 2005, at its 
World Summit the General Assembly adopted a Resolution that included several paragraphs on the 
responsibility to protect and set forth what have since been categorized as three pillars. The first pillar 
of the Resolution requires states to bear the primary responsibility for protecting those within their 
borders from the most serious crimes against humanity: 
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such 
crimes, including their incitement.10 
The international community also has obligations: 
[Second pillar] to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, … to help to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
[Third pillar] In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a 
case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organization as appropriate, should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.11 
This provision emphasizes that the international community has obligations to protect victims of 
serious crimes through various peaceful means, and as a final resort, to protect victims through 
military intervention. The first pillar of the Resolution makes clear that states have a firm, categorical 
responsibility for their own people; however, with regard to the third pillar, states have recognized 
only a collective, contingent, and “case-by-case” responsibility to take military actions for the people 
in other states.12 The World Summit Resolution demonstrates commitment to considerably less than 
the ICISS Report. Yet R2P remains an aspiration and part of the language of humanitarian 
intervention.  
R2P places responsibility on states to protect their populations and repeatedly emphasizes that 
states remain the focus of this responsibility: “[S]overeignty does still matter. It is strongly arguable 
that effective and legitimate states remain the best way to ensure that the benefits of the 
internationalization of trade, investment, technology and communication will be equitably 
shared. …[I]n security terms, a cohesive and peaceful international system is far more likely to be 
achieved through the cooperation of effective states, confident of their place in the world, than in an 
environment of fragile, collapsed, fragmenting or generally chaotic state entities.”13  
Yet R2P goes well beyond a state’s responsibility for human security within its own borders. It 
requires responsibility for human security potentially everywhere. The 2001 Report on R2P turns on 
cosmopolitan concerns14 and highlights the breadth of the aspiration of R2P to protect “human 
                                                     
10 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
11 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
12 See ALEX BELLAMY, GLOBAL POLITICS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM WORDS TO DEEDS 92 (2011) (“[T]he 
main reason for RtoP’s inability to generate additional political will to respond to crises is the indeterminacy of its third 
pillar, which stands in sharp contrast to the relative determinacy of pillar one. To date, in practice all states have to do to 
appear compliant with pillar three in the face of an episode of mass killing is not support genocidaires and accept the 
proposition that international community should do something. Beyond that, it is not clear what RtoP demands in any 
particular case.”). 
13 Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ¶ 1.34 
(December 2001). 
14 The ICISS 2001 Report reflects ideals of global cosmopolitanism by focusing on human interests rather than the interests 
of states. As Charles Beitz explains, “At the deepest level, cosmopolitan liberalism regards the social world as composed 
of persons, not collectivities like societies or peoples, and insists that principles for the relations of societies should be 
based on a consideration of the fundamental interests of persons.” Charles R. Beitz, Rawls’s Law of Peoples, 110 ETHICS 
669, 677 (2000). See also CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979). 
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security.” For example, the Report explains that issues of sovereignty and intervention affect not just 
states, but also individual human beings and that the term “‘responsibility to protect’ … focuses 
attention where it should be most concentrated, on the human needs of those seeking protection or 
assistance. … The traditional, narrow perception of security leaves out the most elementary and 
legitimate concerns of ordinary people regarding security in their daily lives.”15 The Report argues that 
the terms of the debate must shift away from the rights of humanitarian intervention because such 
terms inappropriately focus “attention on the claims, rights and prerogatives of the potentially 
intervening states much more so than on the urgent needs of the potential beneficiaries of the 
action.”16  
The 2005 High-Level Panel Report similarly adopts an ideal of human security focused on 
individuals. The High-Level Panel asserts that the most serious threats to collective security arise with 
respect to “economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental 
degradation.” After these socio-economic concerns, the High-Level Panel discusses, in order of 
importance, inter-state conflict, international conflict, nuclear and biological weapons, terrorism, and 
transnational organized crime.17 Placing socio-economic development as the primary concern 
emphasizes the relative importance of human security and well being as opposed to traditional 
concerns of state sovereignty.18 
R2P begins with state sovereignty, but at its core the doctrine posits a new conception of 
sovereignty, or at least a new emphasis. The 2001 Report explains that when a State signs the UN 
Charter, it accepts certain responsibilities – most importantly it accepts a conception of “sovereignty 
as responsibility in both internal functions and external duties.”19 The Report explains that states must 
meet certain standards of conduct with regard to the protection of human rights. Such obligations stem 
from a variety of sources, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as other 
international human rights instruments and norms. These sources serve “as the concrete point of 
reference against which to judge state conduct.”20 State sovereignty remains important, but the 
international community may judge and evaluate this sovereignty in light of modern human rights 
norms. The crux of the responsibility to protect then is that when states fail to meet basic human rights 
standards, they may be held accountable for their actions by the international community. 
II. The Responsible Sovereign 
R2P reconceptualizes “sovereignty as responsibility.” In the literature on R2P, the responsibilities of a 
state to its own people are often elided with a state’s responsibility to those outside of its borders. Yet 
these are distinct responsibilities and must rest on different foundations. The responsibility of a state to 
its people has a long historical tradition in the development of the nation-state—this is a familiar 
                                                     
15 Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ¶ 2.22-2.23 
(December 2001). 
16 Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ¶ 2.28 
(December 2001). 
17 High-Level Report, A/59/565 p. 25. 
18 ICISS Report at § 2.22 (“One of the virtues of expressing the key issue in this debate as ‘the responsibility to protect’ is 
that it focuses attention where it should be most concentrated, on the human needs of those seeking protection or 
assistance. The emphasis in the security debate shifts, with this focus, from territorial security, and security through 
armaments, to security through human development with access to food and employment, and to environmental 
security.”). 
19 Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ¶ 2.14 
(December 2001). 
20 Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ¶ 2.18 
(December 2001). 
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aspect of the basic relationship between the government and the governed. Although international 
judgment and accountability of these sovereign standards reflects recent development of human rights 
law, the idea of a state’s responsibility to its people is well established. The ICISS Report noted that 
no country challenged this requirement. By contrast, the idea of a state’s responsibility for people in 
other states, presents a very different type of obligation, one with global reach, but ultimately a very 
uncertain scope.  
This Part looks more closely at the new international responsibilities of states and separates out the 
difference between responsibility between State V and People V and the responsibility between State 
R and People V. The first represents a traditional and well-established relationship between a state and 
its people, although it adds an element of oversight by the international community. That is, when 
State V fails to protect its own people, intervention by other states may be permissible or even 
required. Most of the literature focuses the sovereign “rights” of State V, and whether State R can 
intervene under international law.21 I do not address the sovereignty of the vicious or impotent state, or 
the unsettled question of whether intervention is permissible in international law, as it is a topic 
covered extensively by others. Commentators have generally concluded that intervention is 
permissible under international law, or because while not lawful, it can be undertaken and then 
excused.  
What is novel in R2P, however, and without any clear foundation is the responsibility of State R to 
People V—why does State R have a duty to People V? To the extent such a duty exists, it does not rest 
on the same foundations as the responsibility between a state and its people. An affirmative duty to the 
people of another state, as opposed to merely permissible assistance, poses difficult theoretical 
problems, problems not adequately addressed by proponents of R2P. In this Part, I identify and 
examine some of the justifications offered and explain why they ultimately fail, even on their own 
terms, to establish a responsibility that goes beyond the political choices made by states contemplating 
intervention. 
A. Sovereignty as responsibility: A State and its People 
Responsibility to protect requires first that states protect their own people. As the ICISS Report 
explains, 
[R]esponsibility to protect resides first and foremost with the state whose people are directly 
affected. This fact reflects not only international law and the modern state system, but also the 
practical realities of who is best placed to make a positive difference…. When solutions are 
needed, it is the citizens of a particular state who have the greatest interest and the largest stake in 
the success of those solutions, in ensuring that the domestic authorities are fully accountable for 
their actions or inactions in addressing these problems.22  
This principle restates a simple and familiar model of accountability between a state and its people. 
When harms occur within a state, the people can and should identify those harms and work out 
appropriate solutions through their political institutions. 
Internal responsibility of a government to its own people reiterates the Lockean social contract of a 
government created by and for its people. Whatever the social contract includes, it must include basic 
human security. If a state perpetuates genocide and ethnic cleansing, tolerates these crimes, or is 
powerless to halt them, it violates basic aspects of the social contract. Even if state practice belies 
                                                     
21 See, e.g., Olivier Corten, Human Rights and Collective Security: Is There an Emerging Right of Humanitarian 
Intervention?, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE 87 (Philip Alston & Euan MacDonald eds. 
2008) (evaluating whether international law is evolving in the direction of recognizing a right of humanitarian 
intervention). 
22 Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ¶ 2.31 
(December 2001). 
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these basic principles, states have widely accepted these principles as opinio juris, with no state 
contesting this basic responsibility to their own people.23 
This internal responsibility is also reflected in various human rights treaties and agreements. For 
example, the Genocide Convention reflects international condemnation of the crime of genocide, even 
though it does not require states to take action to prevent or halt genocide in other countries.24  
R2P goes further than these existing agreements by explicitly providing international recognition of 
certain minimum aspects of this bargain between people and their government and creating 
accountability when states fail in their obligations. R2P in part posits that domestic failures may erode 
the recognition of a state’s sovereignty by the international community. The ICISS Report posits that 
state conduct can be judged with regard to its adherence to human rights. Responsibility to protect 
includes judgment by the international community. The 2005 World Summit Resolution, although 
more limited, affirms that collective action may be taken when states fail to protect their people from 
mass killing. When states fail to meet basic human rights standards, the international community may 
hold them accountable for their actions.  
Helen Stacy refers to this as a new “relational sovereignty” in which “[t]he sovereign must answer 
not only to its own citizens for its failures of responsibility, but also directly to the international 
community; and in this new generation of negotiations, the stakes are high because the international 
community may decide to overrule sovereignty completely and simply enter the state with its 
peacekeeping forces.”25 Similarly, Anne-Marie Slaughter notes: “[M]embership in the United Nations 
is no longer a validation of sovereign status and a shield against unwanted meddling in a state’s 
domestic jurisdiction. It is rather the right and capacity to participate in the United Nations itself, 
working in concert with other nations to sit in judgment of and take action against threats to human 
security whenever and wherever they arise.”26 Slaughter notes that the responsibility to protect creates 
a sort of “conditional sovereignty,” by which sovereignty is recognized only through compliance with 
UN norms.27 Membership in the UN no longer confirms a state’s sovereignty; rather it defines 
essential components of how sovereign power must be exercised. 
R2P’s conception of sovereignty breaks with traditional Westphalian sovereignty in which 
international law largely did not concern itself with the domestic activities of states. A conditional 
sovereignty instead opens states up to the judgment of other states and the international community. 
Yet R2P has not created a firm mechanism for accountability, either for individual states or for states 
acting collectively through the United Nations. While this external accountability reconceives 
international relations, it may be seen as continuous with other developments in international human 
rights law, which since World War II has expanded to address matters traditionally of domestic 
concern. Even if such standards lack strong external enforcement, by reinforcing the responsibility of 
                                                     
23 See Alex. J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On, 24 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS 143, 160 (2010) 
(“Although there are arguments about their scope (especially concerning crimes against humanity) and the extent to 
which they are embedded or habitual, the basic proposition that states are legally and morally required not to intentionally 
kill civilians is well established. RtoP’s first pillar is therefore best understood as a reaffirmation and codification of 
already existing norms.”). 
24 See, e.g., Henry Shue, Limiting Sovereignty, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 19 
(Jennifer M. Welsh ed. 2004) (noting that the Genocide Convention is “strictly permissive concerning implementation, 
merely inviting any state that should take a notion to do something in order to prevent or punish genocide to approach the 
International Court of Justice, but binding no one to anything. States routinely ignore it in fact.”). 
25 Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2036 (2003). 
26 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 619, 
620 (2005). 
27 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 619, 
628 (2005). 
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states to their own people it at least permits intervention to stop mass atrocities.28 Whether such 
conditional sovereignty will ultimately serve to bolster or to weaken human rights remains an open 
question and one outside of the scope of this Essay. 
The responsibility of a state towards its own citizens is part of a strong historical and philosophical 
tradition. Although this traditionally has been a domestic matter between people their state, R2P aims 
to give international accountability for these traditional state responsibilities. R2P reiterates that a 
state’s legitimacy and recognition by the international community depend on preserving a very 
minimum degree of safety and security for its citizens, and frankly, not much more than this.29 R2P 
aspires to bring international accountability to this responsibility by threatening intervention when 
states fail to meet their basic domestic duties. 
B. Responsibility of states to people outside their borders 
The responsibility of a state to its people reiterates or brings international recognition to the basic 
social contract. While not uncontroversial, this aspect of R2P reinforces a traditional understanding of 
the state’s most basic responsibility to its people. By contrast, responsibility to protect the victims in 
other states posits a new duty. This international, third party responsibility is not about legal 
permission to intervene, but emphatically about responsibility and obligation to intervene in certain 
circumstances.30 The view rests on an assumption that individuals have basic rights to life and 
freedom from grievous harms and such rights create a responsibility of the international community of 
states to protect those rights.  
Yet the responsibility of a state that stands by, causes no harm, but offers no help, is a completely 
different type duty to assist. The state has engaged in no wrongdoing to its own people nor has it 
harmed the people of another state, and yet it has a natural law or moral duty to help those people 
when their basic security is threatened. This new responsibility does not and cannot rest on the same 
foundation as a state’s duty to its own people.  
This Part first considers the nature of the right to protection asserted by victims against other states 
and explains how it is inherently a positive right to assistance or rescue, not a negative right to be left 
alone or a political demand for protection. Given that the right is a positive one to the resources and 
lives of citizens of the intervening state, what creates such an obligation? I evaluate some of the 
                                                     
28 See Lee Feinstein & Erica De Bruin, Beyond Words: U.S. Policy and the Responsibility to Protect, in RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT: THE GLOBAL MORAL COMPACT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 186, 188 (Richard H. Cooper & Juliette Voinov Kohler, 
eds.) (2009) (“The responsibility to protect places individual citizens and their most basic human right—as the 
Declaration of Independence says, ‘the right to life’—at the center of the international system. In doing so, the 
responsibility to protect erodes the classic rational for inaction, namely that intervention to prevent mass atrocities 
constitutes illegal interference in the sovereign affairs of a UN member.”). 
29 Fernando Teson has suggested that intervention should not be limited to egregious cases but should extend also to other 
“situations of serious, disrespectful, yet not genocidal, oppression.” FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: 
AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 16 (1997). Some have even argued for the responsibility to protect other rights, 
such as well-being, welfare, and speech rights. [CITES] The core of the doctrine, however, repeatedly emphasizes its 
limitation to certain egregious crimes against humanity. 
30 See ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 430 (2004) (explaining that although the ICISS Report “stops short of declaring explicitly that there is an obligation 
to protect, it comes very close to it, and clearly goes beyond the traditional assumption that at most intervention is 
permissible. The idea of an international legal order based on obligations to protect human rights may already be 
becoming less radical.”); Louise Arbour, The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice, 
34 REVIEW OF INT’L STUD. 445, 449 (2008) (“The emergence of the new norm has, in my view, serious implications for 
the putative ‘intervener’. No longer holders of a discretionary right to intervene, all States are now burdened with the 
responsibility to take action.”); see also id. at 450 (explaining that potential intervenors “have lost their ‘right’ to 
intervene, a discretionary prerogative, and willingly acquired, instead, a responsibility for a failure to act, a failure for 
which, I suggest, they could be held accountable”). 
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different justifications and explain why they ultimately fail to support the creation of a responsibility 
or duty to intervene. 
1. A positive right for protection 
Although many defenders of R2P prefer to de-emphasize the question of “rights,”31 the development 
of a responsibility assumes some rights of victims of humanitarian crimes. To posit an affirmative duty 
or responsibility of State R to People V requires some understanding and analysis of these rights. A 
closer look suggests that fulfillment of these rights depends on whether it is asserted against one’s own 
government or a foreign government. In both instances the right generally includes a negative right to 
be left alone, to not be harmed by one’s state or other states. It may also include a positive right to be 
protected from harms by private individuals or groups. This affirmative claim for protection has a 
different character when asserted against by people against their own government as opposed to a 
foreign one.  
The responsibility to protect between a state and its people includes in part the negative right to be 
left alone, the right to enjoy one’s life without interference or harm from the state. Many people would 
also say that a state owes more than this—that within a political society individuals have some right to 
be kept safe, for the state to ensure certain conditions of safety to person and property. This is a 
positive claim for protection from harm by private actors and virtually all governments provide some 
form of this protection through their criminal justice systems. This demand, however, is a political one 
within the state about what sort of public resources should be allocated to crime prevention, police, 
incarceration, and rehabilitation. People will work through their political institutions to determine the 
degree and sort of protection provided by the state. Different societies will strike their own balance of 
state protection and self-protection.  
It is instructive that even within most liberal, rights-respecting countries there is no free-floating 
right to safety or protection from private actors. In the United States, the Supreme Court has made 
clear that the government does not have an affirmative obligation to protect individuals, even though it 
may have an obligation to refrain from harmful activities.32 Even when the government may have a 
special relationship with a person, there is no right to state protection absent the clearest indication that 
the government has assumed such an obligation.33 Many civil law countries impose duties to rescue on 
other individuals, but not the state. These duties, however, are cabined by various requirements that 
assistance be reasonable in the circumstances and that a person need not endanger his own safety to 
provide assistance.34 Good Samaritan laws are always conditioned on the requirement that rescue must 
be undertaken only if it can be done without imperiling the rescuer.35 The qualifications on the duty 
mean that in practice it will depend a judgment on the part of the would-be rescuer as to whether 
rescue can be undertaken safely.  
                                                     
31 See Gareth Evans, End of the Argument: How we won the debate over stopping genocide, Foreign Policy (Dec. 2011) 
(explaining that the responsibility to protect concept caught on so quickly in part because “we used language that was 
inherently less confrontational—emphasizing no one’s ‘right’ but everyone’s “responsibility”). 
32 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that the failure 
to protect a child from his abusive father even after the child was within the social services system did not violate the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
33 See, e.g., Castle Rock v. Gonzlaes, 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
34 See, e.g., John T. Pardun, Good Samaritan Laws: A Global Perspective, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 591 (1998) 
(examining good Samaritan laws in various jurisdictions). 
35 See David Luban, Intervention and Civilization: Some Unhappy Lessons of the Kosovo War, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND 
TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON THE MORAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION 94 (De Grieff & 
Cronin, eds.) (discussing good Samaritan laws in the context of humanitarian intervention and observing that states have 
no genuine obligation to intervene when it would risk lives, even if we should feel ashamed not to intervene). [CITE on 
good Samaritan laws in U.S. states or abroad?] 
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Similarly, with R2P, the responsibility, such as it is, does not impose an absolute duty on states to 
risk the lives of its citizens. Instead, it turns on the judgment of an intervening state as to whether 
rescuing the victims of humanitarian crimes can be done without disproportionate cost. As Jose 
Alvarez notes, humanitarian intervention, much like Good Samaritan laws, allows an intervening state 
an excuse against a charge of unlawful action. R2P, however, requires states to be responsible for 
humanitarian crimes in other states, a move that will likely “prove to be a step too far internationally 
(if not nationally).”36  
Some countries list rights to personal security and safety as a constitutional right, but beyond 
ordinary criminal process, protections must be provided through political institutions, through 
legislation allocating resources for crime prevention. The political process negotiates different 
expectations about what the state must provide and how. These are difficult political questions—
particularly since the benefits of increased security must be balanced against civil liberties and other 
values, not to mention costs. 
In the domestic context, state protection from private actors is a positive good and is provided 
through a political demand between people and their government. In the international realm where 
People V make a demand for protection from foreign states, the demand is similarly a positive one but 
without the political process for invoking such a demand.  
Initially, I should note that People V have negative rights to be left alone by State R, but these are 
not at issue in the context of R2P. Although there is a well-recognized negative right of non-
intervention, proponents of R2P go to some trouble to explain why State V relinquishes this right to be 
left alone when it harms its people or stands by while its people are harmed. The responsibility to 
protect does away with the relevant negative rights to be left alone. There may be some other very 
basic negative rights at issue, such as State R might have an obligation to refrain from taking actions 
that might make the situation in State V worse.  
In the invocation of a responsibility to protect by third parties, People V claim a positive right to 
protection from State R—a right to what essentially amounts to rescue from the harms inflicted either 
by their government or by other actors while their government stands by. The request or right to 
military or other assistance is a positive one, a demand to be liberated from conditions of violence 
prevailing in one’s own state.  
Yet unlike in the domestic context, People V cannot make a political demand for State R to provide 
protection. People V are not part of State R’s political society. The leaders of State R are not 
politically accountable to People V. Rather State R’s politicians face their own political pressures—
domestic and international. The claims of People V will present a moral demand to assist individuals 
in need.37 The plight of People V may even create political pressure through interest groups, the 
media, or international organizations, but whatever pressure exists will be part of a political balance in 
which these interests are not directly represented. This is not the case of a government weighing how 
to use its resources for the benefit of its own people. Instead it is a government weighing how to use 
its resources for the benefit of people in another state. State R will balance using its resources for 
humanitarian intervention against domestic needs. Only the most naïve account of politics would 
suggest that the balancing takes the same form in one case as the other. 
                                                     
36 Jose E. Alvarez, The Schizophrenias of R2P, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE 283 (Philip 
Alston & Euan MacDonald eds. 2008). 
37 See David Luban, Intervention and Civilization: Some Unhappy Lessons of the Kosovo War, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND 
TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON THE MORAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION 94, 99 (De Grieff & 
Cronin, eds.) (arguing that even if we do not have an obligation to prevent violations of human rights we may have moral 
reasons for helping because “We shame ourselves by not living up to important standards that we have advertised to 
others; even if failure is not culpable, it diminishes us. Professing to believe in the value of human beings, then refusing 
to protect them as they are murdered or driven from their homes, is paradigmatically shameful.”). 
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It is important to stress here that the fact that People V lack representation in State R or are not part 
of the political community of State R is not to say that they do not have human rights. It is not 
necessary even that State R’s domestic politics have moral priority (although perhaps they should).38 
Rather, this is a recognition that whatever right to protect People V may have, at present the scope of 
this protection depends on political determinations about resources and appropriate actions given all 
the circumstances. The political determinations may turn on any number of factors, including what the 
nation feels that it must provide for intervention—including the costs in terms of military support and 
soldiers’ lives. State R will fulfill any responsibility through its own particular political calculus, as 
discussed in greater detail in Part IV.  
Although some proponents would shift the discussion away from “rights,” understanding 
international responsibility depends in part on having some basic concept of the rights of People V 
with regard to states not their own. They may have a negative right to be free from violence from their 
own and other states. Yet when they ask the international community or any other particular State R 
for assistance, they ask for the fulfillment of a positive right. This basic concept highlights that such 
rights when asserted against the international community are positive ones and glossing over this fact 
does not change the nature of the claim. 
2. Possible foundations for third-party responsibility  
As explained above, the responsibility of a state to protect its own people is grounded in traditional 
understandings of the social contract and the relationship between a state and its people. The real crux 
of R2P, however, relates to the third-party responsibility to protect people in another state. This 
responsibility is properly understood as a positive claim of People V to protection from the grievous 
conditions prevailing in their state. Does R2P create or identify a duty to fulfill this claim? The 
responsibility might be legal or moral and I consider each in turn. 
a. No legal obligation to intervene 
States might have a legal responsibility to protect people in another state through (1) an international 
agreement or (2) because such responsibility is a requirement of customary international law. There 
are no treaties or other specific legal commitments to a responsibility to protect, although it is often 
suggested that responsibility to protect is implicit in some international agreements and human rights 
treaties.39 Many states have expressed approval of R2P in various non-binding statements, but have 
not taken further legal steps, such as by embodying the requirement in a treaty or other agreement. 
The 2005 World Summit Resolution recognizes some general contours of the responsibility to 
protect, which included a firm statement about the responsibility of each individual state to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. With regard to 
third-party responsibility, however, the Resolution recognized only that states were prepared to take 
“collective action” through the Security Council and on a “case-by-case basis.”40 This hardly suggests 
recognition or agreement for states to assume responsibility for people in other countries.  
Some have suggested that the Genocide Convention might support responsibility to protect. The 
International Court of Justice’s decision in the Bosnia genocide case recognized state responsibility for 
                                                     
38 See Allen Buchanan, The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, 7 J. OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 71, 80-81 
(1999). 
39 See ICISS Report, section 6.17 page 50 (noting that the emerging principle of responsibility to protect is “grounded in a 
miscellany of legal foundations (human rights treaty provisions, the Genocide Convention, Geneva Conventions, 
International Criminal Court statute and the like” as well as developing state practice and Security Council practice).  
40 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
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genocide and held that states have a duty not to perpetrate genocide.41 Some have argued that the 
decision goes further and stands for the principle that the Genocide Convention creates some 
responsibility of states to prevent genocide even outside their borders.42 Yet most commentators seem 
to consider this an expansive or perhaps aspirational reading of the Convention and one not supported 
by state practice.43 
Moreover, responsibility to protect has not been recognized by states as a norm of customary 
international law, which is traditionally defined as a “customary practice of states followed from a 
sense of legal obligation.”44 For example, the United States has endorsed the concept, but has stressed 
that the responsibility is not a legal obligation, but a moral one, different in nature from the obligation 
of a state to its own citizens.45 Similarly, although Canada strongly endorses R2P, the government also 
notes that the state has the first responsibility followed by the international community’s moral 
obligation in the face of grave crisis.46 The United Kingdom and other states have noted that 
responsibility to victims must be fulfilled on a case-by-case basis.47 Other states such as China, India, 
and Russia have not endorsed the concept and have expressed doubts about its meaning and 
application.48 
Most commentators have rightly concluded that there is no customary international norm regarding 
the third-party responsibility to protect.49 Moreover, R2P has not addressed the difficulties of treating 
the “responsibility” as a legal one on states or the United Nations.50 Although there are examples of 
                                                     
41 See Judgment of 26 February 2007, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), ICJ Reports (2007). 
42 See Mark Toufayan, The World Court’s Distress When Facing Genocide, 40 TEX. INT’L L. J. 233, 236 (2005) (arguing for 
a purposive reading of the Genocide Convention that includes a duty to prevent genocide wherever it occurs); Louise 
Arbour, The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice, 34 REVIEW OF INT’L STUD. 445, 
451 (2008) (arguing that the ICJ Bosnia decision stands for the principle that “the prevention of genocide is a legal 
obligation, and it is a justiciable obligation that one State effectively owes to the citizens of another State, outside its own 
territory”).  
43 See Yuval Shany, The Road to the Genocide Convention and Beyond, in THE UN GENOCIDE CONVENTION—A 
COMMENTARY 24 (Paola Gaeta, ed. 2009) (noting that an expansive interpretation of the Genocide Convention to include 
prevention and intervention would “far exceed in scope the extent of the customary norm”); Henry Shue, Limiting 
Sovereignty, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 20 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed. 2004) (noting 
that there is no obligation to rescue victims of genocide as “the Genocide Convention requires no one to take any action; 
the UN Charter permits but does not require action; and Security Council practice is not to send troops or, if as in 
Rwanda troops are already there, to yank them out in order to avoid danger to them and embarrassment to the Council.”). 
44 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1986). 
45 See Lee Feinstein & Erica De Bruin, Beyond Words: U.S. Policy and the Responsibility to Protect, in RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT: THE GLOBAL MORAL COMPACT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 186 (Richard H. Cooper & Juliette Voinov Kohler, eds.) 
(2009) (noting that in World Summit negotiations the United States wanted to insure that “the responsibility of the 
international community to prevent atrocities discussed in the outcome document did not create a new legal obligation, 
but instead referred to a moral responsibility. … [T]he United States argued that the responsibility of the international 
community was different from—and secondary to—that of individual states.”). 
46 See State-by-State Positions on the Responsibility to Protect, available at  
 www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Chart_R2P_11August.pdf. 
47 See State-by-State Positions on the Responsibility to Protect, available at  
 www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Chart_R2P_11August.pdf. 
48 See State-by-State Positions on the Responsibility to Protect, available at  
 www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Chart_R2P_11August.pdf. 
49 See, e.g., Alex. J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On, 24 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS 143, 160 (2010) 
(“[T]he state practice documented in the previous section suggests that mutual recognition of a positive duty to exercise 
pillars two and three [of the 2005 Resolution] is inconsistent at best.”). 
50 See Jose E. Alvarez, The Schizophrenias of R2P, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE 282-3 (Philip 
Alston & Euan MacDonald eds. 2008) (discussing some of the doctrinal difficulties of imposing “legal responsibility” on 
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intervention and subsequent approval or endorsement of some interventions, responding to 
humanitarian crimes is far from consistent state practice. Historically there are far more examples of 
states committing atrocities than of other states intervening to protect the victims of those crimes. As 
Michael Walzer has observed, “[M]urder on a smaller scale [than the holocaust] is so common as to be 
almost ordinary. On the other hand—or perhaps for this very reason—clear examples of what is called 
‘humanitarian intervention’ are very rare.”51 Existing state practice and examples of intervention do 
not rise to the level of customary international law. Although proponents of R2P have expressed the 
view that R2P is developing into a norm of customary international law or should be treated as one, 
they recognize that it has not reached this status.52 Whatever responsibility exists is generally not 
framed as a legal duty to others. 
b. Strict moral duty 
Understandably, much of the focus of the literature is on the rights of victims and the moral priority of 
these rights. A harder question is whether these rights create a moral responsibility for other states to 
act. Several scholars have taken up the question of whether states have a moral duty to respond. Some 
argue that states have a strict moral duty not only to respect the rights of individuals but also to ensure 
that other states and private actors respect the rights of individuals.  
For example, Fernando Teson suggests that states may be culpable for failure to act at least in some 
circumstances because of the respect we owe to others as human agents.53 In the broadest terms, 
“Because human rights are rights held by individuals by virtue of their personhood, they are 
independent of history, culture, or national borders.”54 Teson suggests that states are created to serve 
the rights and interests of individuals and this extends to serving the rights and interests of individuals 
even outside of a state’s borders.55  
Similarly, Carla Bagnoli argues that states have a perfect duty to help victims in other states.56 She 
criticizes the focus on permissibility of intervention, because “[t]his implies that states have the right 
to remain neutral in the face of human rights violations in other countries and that their neutrality is 
not morally objectionable.”57 Bagnoli argues instead that basic human rights are claims of all persons 
that require certain duties of respect and mutual recognition.58 From this principle she asserts, “It 
(Contd.)                                                                  
states or the UN and observing that “the concept of R2P cannot plausibly short-circuit the difficult political negotiations 
that would be necessary to overcome such difficulties”). 
51 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 101 (1977) (4th ed 2006). 
52 See ICISS Report, §2.24 at page 15 (“While there is not yet a sufficiently strong basis to claim the emergence of a new 
principle of customary international law, growing state and regional organization practice as well as Security Council 
precedent suggest an emerging guiding principle.”); see also id. at § 6.17 at page 50 (“it may eventually be that a new 
rule of customary international law to this effect comes to be recognizes, but … it would be quite premature to make any 
claim about the existence now of such a rule”).  
53 Fernando R. Teson, The liberal case for humanitarian intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, 
AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 121-122 (J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane eds. 2003). 
54 Fernando R. Teson, The liberal case for humanitarian intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, 
AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 94 (J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane eds. 2003). 
55 See FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 16 (1997) (“[F]rom an 
ethical standpoint, the rights of states under international law are properly derived from individual rights. I therefore 
reject the notion that states have any autonomous moral standing—that they hold international rights that are independent 
from the rights of individuals who populate the state.”). 
56 Carla Bagnoli, Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty: A Kantian Argument, in Humanitarian Intervention, 
NOMOS XLVII 118 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. Williams, eds.). 
57 Carla Bagnoli, Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty: A Kantian Argument, in Humanitarian Intervention, 
NOMOS XLVII 118 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. Williams, eds.). 
58 Carla Bagnoli, Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty: A Kantian Argument, in Humanitarian Intervention, 
NOMOS XLVII 126 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. Williams, eds.). 
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follows from it that neutrality is morally inadmissible, that the decision not to intervene calls for blame 
and other moral sanctions. The perfect duty to coerce the offender is complementary to the perfect 
duty to protect the victim.”59 
These arguments support the idea that State R must refrain from harming its own people as well as 
people in other states. These arguments even support the principle that intervention by State R to 
protect People V can be morally justified and even morally praiseworthy. Yet they often fail to fill in 
the hardest part of argument—why must State R protect People V? If people have natural human rights 
to safety and security, this may require that State R not harm People V, the basic negative right of not 
being harmed. Yet these human rights do not necessarily give rise to an obligation on behalf of foreign 
states to intervene to ensure security and safety.60 Even if states are the instruments of individuals, as 
Teson argues, this does not explain why State R must be used as the instrument of People V. States are 
entities for their people. State R may thus be an instrument to meet the needs of People R but that 
logic does not make State R an instrument of people in need everywhere. Teson’s argument may 
explain why intervention into State V is permissible, as State V has failed to protect its own people. 
Yet this argument does not provide a justification for why any State R must intervene to protect 
People V. This is particularly true because this obligation is a positive one to do something—to 
provide assistance through diplomatic, financial, or military means. 
Moreover, the most rigorous assertions of cosmopolitan moral duties are often short on details 
about how such duty will be implemented. “The appeal to fundamental human rights only determines 
that intervention is a strict moral duty. Who should perform the duty is a separate question, one that 
must be decided by reconsidering the grounds for proper authority.”61 Of course, some might argue 
that it is precisely this question of who performs the duty that matters in the face of genocide and other 
mass killings. 
c. Imperfect moral duty 
Recognizing the difficulty of asserting that any particular State R has a duty to People V, other 
scholars have suggested that the responsibility to protect is an imperfect obligation. Kok-Chor Tan 
observes that the ICISS Report does not explain why permissible intervention also generates a 
responsibility, because “permissibility alone does not necessarily generate an obligation.”62 He argues 
that there is a duty to protect that arises from the “moral seriousness of humanitarian intervention.”63 
Yet he notes that it does not belong to any particular state agent— “[s]omeone ought to intervene, but 
no specific state in the society of states is morally bound to do so.”64  
                                                     
59 Carla Bagnoli, Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty: A Kantian Argument, in Humanitarian Intervention, 
NOMOS XLVII 130 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. Williams, eds.). 
60 David Luban makes a similar point: “The right not to be tortured imposes a demand on all of humanity, and that 
conclusion follows from the bare acknowledgement that we have a right not to be tortured. But from the conceptual point 
alone all that follows is the negative demand that everyone must refrain from torture, not the positive requirement that 
anyone must intervene to stop others from torturing.” David Luban, Intervention and Civilization: Some Unhappy 
Lessons of the Kosovo War, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON THE MORAL AND POLITICAL 
CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION 94 (De Grieff & Cronin, eds.). 
61 Carla Bagnoli, Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty: A Kantian Argument, in Humanitarian Intervention, 
NOMOS XLVII 131 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. Williams, eds.). 
62 Kok-Chor Tan, The Duty to Protect, in Humanitarian Intervention, NOMOS XLVII p. 89 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. 
Williams, eds.). 
63 Kok-Chor Tan, The Duty to Protect, in Humanitarian Intervention, NOMOS XLVII p. 94 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. 
Williams, eds.). 
64 Kok-Chor Tan, The Duty to Protect, in Humanitarian Intervention, NOMOS XLVII p. 95 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. 
Williams, eds.). 
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Tan argues strenuously that this does not diminish the seriousness of the duty—it only creates a 
duty of the international community “to make perfect, through cooperation and coordination, what 
might be otherwise an imperfect duty to protect.”65 Yet what precisely must be done to take the duty 
seriously is hard to pin down. A special relationship to the victims may generate expectations and 
states may be required to create international organizations for the protection of human rights. Yet it is 
not clear why having an imperfect duty creates an obligation to perfect that duty either through 
individual state action or institutional cooperation. Tan acknowledges, “It is a strategic problem: there 
is no identifiable agent who can be called upon to act.”66  
Allen Buchanan notes that states have a negative duty to refrain from harming individuals in other 
states because of “the moral importance of human beings as such, and the role which the fulfillment of 
negative duties in question plays in protecting certain fundamental interests in liberty and wellbeing 
that human beings as such have.”67 From this familiar negative duty to leave alone, however, 
Buchanan argues that certain positive duties must follow as well. The basic moral rights of persons 
require that states fulfill positive duties to all persons, within and outside of their borders.68  
Regardless of how appealing this moral vision may be, Buchanan does not explain the extension 
from negative obligations to leave people alone to positive obligations to assist them. In part, this may 
be because Buchanan misidentifies the reason for negative duties. Such negative duties between states 
to leave each other alone stemmed originally from the reciprocal relationship between states to not 
harm each other (and by extension their people).69 The value of persons undoubtedly bolsters this 
negative duty, but historically it was not the primary reason for forbearance by states in international 
law. Buchanan simply asserts that if people have certain negative rights “then surely one ought not 
only to respect persons’ rights by not violating them. One ought also to contribute to creating 
arrangements that will ensure that persons’ rights are not violated.”70 Henry Shue makes a similar 
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to ensuring that all persons have access to just institutions, where this means primarily institutions that protect basic 
human rights”). 
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point that negative rights to be secure include certain protections that involve positive duties, and that 
such duties can extend even to people in other countries.71 
Even accepting the reasoning suggested by Buchanan that positive and negative rights exist on a 
continuum—still there is a sizable gap between requiring State R to leave others alone and obliging it 
to provide assistance to People V. Buchanan recognizes some of these limits when he acknowledges 
that the natural duty to assist people everywhere may only be an imperfect one and not enforceable72 
and the duty to help exists only if a state can assist “without excessive costs.”73 These practical 
concessions do more to explain the contours of state obligation than abstract duties of justice because 
they acknowledge the contingent, qualified nature of the obligation. 
Although Tan and Buchanan aim to find a theoretical source for obligation and duty, they 
recognize limits on the duty and the difficulty of attaching the duty to any particular actor. In any 
particular circumstance no state has a duty to act and no state has a duty when action would impose 
excessive costs. These limitations, however, call into question whether the obligation to assist others is 
truly a duty, as opposed to a call for beneficence by others to act on behalf of the victims.  
d. Consequentialist duty 
The articulation of R2P by interest groups and the United Nations has a distinctly consequentialist 
component, perhaps acknowledging the reality of how such a responsibility will work in practice 
between states. The ICISS report, for example, assigns responsibility, but remains mindful of 
consequences when it limits intervention to a narrow category of extreme cases and ensures 
proportionality between the response and likely benefits or intervention. Similarly, the 2005 World 
Summit Resolution first pillar recognizes a state’s responsibility for its people. Yet the third pillar 
recognizes consequential concerns when it affirms only a collective responsibility for states to people 
in other states to be exercises on a case-by-case basis. 
Although the scholarly literature has tended to focus on the importance of rights and duties, others 
have sought to provide a justification for intervention along consequentialist lines. Eric Heinze, for 
instance, suggests that states must weigh the welfare of individuals taking into account the costs and 
benefits of intervention.74 His chosen metric is “human security as the general account of human well-
being—or ‘good’—that the conduct of humanitarian intervention ought to promote or maximize.”75 
He would have states consider whether, given the circumstances at the time, intervention would 
promote human security.76  
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Consequentialist reasoning attempts to more realistically consider how states should behave. 
Moreover, it honestly acknowledges the consequentialist component of most theories of R2P. 
Virtually all accounts of the responsibility apply only to serious crimes or widespread cases of 
genocide and mass killing. If the responsibility truly stems from the human rights of people to be free 
of violence, it is difficult to explain why the responsibility must be limited to serious violations of 
human rights. Yet most supporters at least implicitly recognize that intervention requires trade-offs, 
including that states have limited resources and that intervention may cause an escalation in violence. 
Even those who posit a moral duty on behalf of states recognize the consequentialist reasoning 
involved when states use force and must determine how to maximize human rights observance77 or 
that interventions are obliged only when they can be done without excessive costs.78 Similarly, states 
with the “right” motives cannot be certain that their interventions will have good results.79 
Even focusing only on the good of human security, balancing requires the exercise of judgment by 
states. Often it will be unknown and contested whether intervention will promote security. As Heinze 
admits, predicting the consequences of action in most circumstances is difficult to do.80 After the fact, 
observers and states often disagree about whether an intervention promoted security. For example, 
many hail the Libya intervention as a success in toppling Qaddafi and halting violence,81 whereas 
others suggest intervention unnecessarily escalated violence and led to even more deaths than if the 
uprising had taken its course without outside interference.82 A year after the intervention, debate 
continues about the legal and practical consequences of the intervention.  
Yet once R2P is seen as a consequentialist doctrine, subject to the balancing of the need of human 
security, it simply opens up the question of what other interests and goods a state can take into 
account. Can a state balance human security against domestic politics or other geopolitical concerns? 
Can a state weigh the security of its citizens and the lives of its military personnel more heavily than 
victims in other states? Although consequentialists want to focus on human security abstractly, a state 
will likely consider questions of well-being in the context of their particular needs. Despite the 
acknowledgment and concern for the moral seriousness of these humanitarian crimes, the uncertainty 
of assessing the effects of intervention on People V and their security suggests that when 
contemplating intervention states will focus on factors that might be more readily apparent, such as 
domestic political pressures, national security, and costs.  
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3. Difficulty of theoretical justifications 
Proponents of R2P have failed to identify the particular duty that State R owes to People V and to 
provide an adequate foundation for it. Even theorists that posit a serious moral obligation of states to 
people everywhere recognize that this obligation is circumscribed by some important limitations. The 
moral duty to others generally arises only for very serious transgressions of human rights, including 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In addition, it does not exist at 
all costs, but only for states with capacity to exercise the duty. Given these important limits, both in 
theory and in practice determinations about when State R must help People V will turn on a number of 
open-ended standards, contingent upon judgments regarding effectiveness and cost that will 
necessarily be highly contested.  
These limitations derive in part from the nature of the asserted duty, which is a positive one. A duty 
to help or rescue victims in another state requires the use of diplomatic, economic, and, in serious 
cases, military resources and the lives of citizens—only a state with certain capacities can fulfill this 
obligation. Although some express skepticism about whether there is a clean line between negative 
and positive rights, such skepticism makes most sense in the domestic context where the state and 
people are intertwined in so many ways. In the international context, at least at present where there is 
no international authority that enforces or mandates intervention, the negative/positive distinction is 
more straightforward. Negative rights between State R and People V are relatively clear. The negative 
right is one of non-interference, non-intervention in another state. These are reciprocal rights in the 
international realm—the fundamental rule of non-interference. When State R leaves State V and its 
people alone, without harming them or discriminating against their interests, State R fulfills its 
negative duties.  
By contrast, it is unclear whether State R has a responsibility to People V. Moreover, even if one 
simply posits such a duty based on the seriousness of basic human rights, the positive right to 
protection for one’s human rights does not have any fixed content. The strongest proponents of R2P 
cannot say precisely what State R must do to ensure protection for People V. As Alex Bellamy has 
noted: “It is seldom—if ever—clear what RtoP requires in a given situation. This is partly because of 
the indeterminacy of the norm itself and its place relative to other norms, such as noninterference. 
Indeterminacy is produced by a combination of uncertainty about what is expected, disagreements 
about what ought to be expected, and an interest in preserving flexibility for the future.”83 Even 
assuming agreement on basic principles of responsibility, there remain difficult questions about what 
action best respects rights; what will serve to promote human rights and security overall; and what 
capability a state has to halt violations of human rights. The duty will be contingent on political, 
military and other circumstances and uncertain in any particular instance.  
The assessment of the responsibility to protect will thus depend on the state undertaking the 
intervention. This suggests that whatever duty exists may be better characterized as beneficence. As 
President Obama said in the context of the intervention in Libya, in which American national interest 
was far from clear, we have a “responsibility to act.” He phrased it as a responsibility, but really it was 
a choice to intervene in Libya, but not Syria, Sudan or Iran. The choice turned on an assessment by the 
government of myriad factors, including presumably predictions about what American involvement 
would accomplish and at what cost. This moral choice, a choice to assist, by its nature will be defined 
by those exercising it. In this context, states may assume a responsibility, but they do so when they 
believe the circumstances warrant it and also to the extent they believe necessary and appropriate in 
the circumstances. 
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III. Overcoming neutrality 
Whether and to what extent states have rights to neutrality further complications the assertion of a 
“responsibility.” Much of the literature on R2P and humanitarian intervention considers whether states 
can overcome the principle of non-intervention spelt out in the UN Charter. This inquiry focuses on 
the permissibility of intervention under international law—whether State R can use force to halt crimes 
against individuals in State V. Yet as discussed above, the real crux of the responsibility between 
states is not one of permissibility, but instead the obligation of State R to use resources to halt crimes 
in State V. As a matter of international law then, it is surprising that there has been almost no attention 
paid to whether this the “responsibility” can overcome State R’s assertion of neutrality.84  
Responsibility to protect depends on State R to protect People V and take actions that are costly in 
terms of lives and other resources, often have uncertain results, and perhaps only a tenuous connection 
to their national interests. In light of all this, why can states simply not stand aside? Do states have any 
right under international law to not be involved? Regardless of whether such a position generates our 
moral condemnation, do states have this right? It seems as though a consideration of the question of 
neutrality may be at least as important as non-intervention, if not more so. The reasons given for 
allowing intervention in State V—that it has given up aspects of sovereignty by failing to fulfill the 
most basic social contract—simply do not apply to State R as bystander. 
This Part considers briefly aspects of the modern status of neutrality and examines some historical 
analogies to positive duties of neutral states to belligerents. Although support for neutrality has waxed 
and waned over the last century, it continues to survive.85 The doctrine of R2P has not provided a 
justification for overriding a state’s assertion of neutrality rights when confronted with violations of 
human rights in another state.  
A. Modern doctrine of neutrality 
There has been scant scholarly attention paid to neutrality since World War II. Some scholars have 
argued that the United Nations made neutrality obsolete. The UN Charter restricts the use of force and 
resort to war86 and requires that all member states provide “every assistance in any action [the United 
Nations] takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any 
state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.”87 Moreover, the 
Security Council has authority to determine whether a state is unlawful aggressor.88 In this 
circumstance, other states are bound not to lend assistance to the aggressor state and may lend 
assistance to any state that is a victim of an act of aggression.89 Stephen Neff explains that along with 
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the creation of the United Nations and the ideal of collective security came the resurgence of a 
suspicion of neutrality: “The hope was that there would no longer be gladiators and onlookers, 
belligerents and neutrals. In their place, there would only be aggressors, on the one hand, and victims 
and policemen, on the other.”90  
Yet neutrality law, though perhaps modified, continues to survive in at least some form. Neff offers 
a number of observations for its durability, including that despite the UN Charter, it often remains 
difficult to identify the “right” and “wrong” side of international conflicts.91 Moreover, there is 
“general consensus” that the traditional law of neutrality codified in the Hague Conventions of 1907 
and the London Naval Protocol of 1936 remains in effect.92 Despite some uncertainty about the precise 
contours of neutrality law, states have continued to assert neutrality in armed conflicts, even after the 
Security Council has acted.93 
B. Some thoughts on neutrality and R2P 
Scholars disagree about the applicability and content of the law of neutrality, and in practice, states 
assert and enforce neutrality on a case-by-case basis. Yet neither in theory nor practice have neutral 
states been required to provide affirmative support for belligerents or their victims. Given the staying 
power of the law of neutrality even after the creation of the UN, proponents of R2P should take 
seriously the possibility that claims of neutrality may trump any responsibility to protect. It is beyond 
the scope of this essay to thoroughly consider the relationship between neutrality and R2P, but even a 
brief consideration of neutrality in this context raises some difficult questions. 
First, does the law of neutrality apply to humanitarian interventions? Traditionally, the law of 
neutrality applies when there is a “state of war”; however, it is unclear when there is a state of war, 
short of a declaration, which rarely occurs.94 For example, Christopher Greenwood notes that states 
have not agreed to an objective definition of war and so each state must determine for itself whether a 
state of war exists and whether it chooses to declare itself neutral.95 According to Wolff Heintschel 
von Heinegg, modern practice suggests that the law of neutrality applies, at least in part, to any armed 
conflict and “the applicability of the law of neutrality depends on functional considerations that will, 
in most cases, result in a differential or partial applicability of that body of law.”96 The ongoing war on 
terror further raises questions about what constitutes a state of war and the rights and obligations of 
states with regard to the global war on terror.97 
Second, and related to the first question, how does the law of neutrality apply to intra-state 
conflicts, which make up most circumstances calling for intervention? Neutrality traditionally applied 
to international armed conflicts, because it was triggered by a state of war. The traditional 
understanding of sovereignty required that states not interfere in civil wars or other disputes within 
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another state. Yet in practice, states have often intervened in various ways in such armed conflicts. 
Many have argued that in such circumstances, third states can adopt a position of “benevolent” 
neutrality in which one party to a conflict has violated the jus ad bellum.98 “[W]ith the modern jus ad 
bellum distinguishing at least in theory between lawful and unlawful use of force—or rather between 
lawful and unlawful wars—States are entitled to support the victim of aggression under the right of 
collective self-defense. … If States are entitled to militarily assist a victim of aggression by actively 
joining in the hostilities, then a fortiori they must be entitled to distinguish between the aggressor and 
assist the alleged victim by means short of war.”99 Given the changing nature of warfare and in light of 
previous uncertainty about when a state of war existed, there are ample reasons for considering that 
even civil conflicts trigger at least some aspects the law of neutrality.100 Moreover, there might be 
some disconnect in assuming that domestic humanitarian crimes are a matter of international concern, 
but then not recognizing that such domestic conflicts trigger the laws of war, including of neutrality. 
At least this is something that R2P should confront as a possibility.  
Third, does Security Council action eliminate state claims of neutrality? The UN Charter creates a 
distinction between just and unjust belligerents, particularly once the UN Security Council identifies 
an aggressor state. But as von Heinegg observes, often the Security Council does not make an 
authoritative determination and so “A UN member State is prohibited from taking a neutral stance 
only if the Security Council has authoritatively identified the aggressor or if it has decided on 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”101 Even in the face of Security Council action, states have 
asserted their neutrality, for example during the Korean War and the Persian Gulf War.102 In addition, 
states often simply fail to provide assistance. State practice suggests that neutrality remains a part of 
international law. 
Fourth, what positive duties might a neutral state have to victims of belligerent action? Although 
neutrality law remains uncertain on a number of points, neither theories of neutrality nor state practice 
included a requirement of neutral states to assist belligerent states or victims of war within that 
state.103 The rights of belligerents did not include positive assistance by neutral states. Historically, 
belligerents had certain rights including some ability to transgress the territory or requisition the 
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property of neutral states. These rights, however, were secured by force. Neutral states were not 
expected to simply offer up assistance—the belligerent’s rights were a concession to force and 
necessity rather than any requirement of the neutral state.  
There is, of course, a material difference between a belligerent taking something from a neutral and 
the neutral being obliged to provide assistance to the warring state. These belligerent rights do not 
logically extend to affirmative duties of neutrals to help victims in other states. The rights of 
belligerents were justified based on necessity and what the belligerents could take. These justifications 
do not support an obligation of humanitarian aid by the neutral state. When human rights are being 
violated, R2P and related doctrines posit a humanitarian necessity for assistance. Yet while People V 
may need assistance, practically they are not in a position to command it. Just as a weak belligerent 
could not require the assistance of a neutral state—People V must depend on a neutral State R to help. 
This reality is one of the reasons why R2P depends on a moral claim, because individuals in this 
circumstance cannot command assistance.  
These questions highlight just some of the potential difficulties that the law of neutrality might 
pose for the responsibility to protect. In general, the law of neutrality restrains both belligerents and 
neutrals.104 Neutrality imposes certain duties, but these are largely negative duties to refrain from 
certain actions. Even if neutrality does not prevent humanitarian intervention against State V, states 
called to assist People V can choose neutrality over intervention.105  
The principles of non-intervention and neutrality both derive from state sovereignty. In this classic 
view, states have a sovereign right not to be interfered with in their domestic matters and they have a 
right to remain neutral in the disputes and armed conflicts of other states. Both concepts are supported 
by similar values of avoiding the expansion of armed conflict and promoting peaceful relations 
between states. R2P posits that states give up the right of non-intervention when they fail to respect the 
basic human rights of their people. Although it should be noted that even the permissibility of 
intervention remains controversial, the conditional view of sovereignty at least depends on the 
wrongdoing of the state or its inability to protect its people. Peaceful conditions are not prevailing 
within the state and therefore other states may intervene to protect human rights. The sovereignty of 
State V yields because it is perpetrating, tolerating, or is powerless to halt crimes against humanity.  
No similar justification requires a neutral state to affirmatively assist the people of other states. The 
crimes occurring in State V do not automatically eliminate State R’s sovereignty, including assertions 
of neutrality—which is to say that there is no account of why State R’s sovereignty would be 
conditional on harms in State V. Humanitarian concerns may remove the prohibition against State R 
intervening in a domestic armed conflict; however, they have not arisen to an obligation for State R to 
intervene in such a conflict.  
Whatever lack of clarity surrounds the law of neutrality, this uncertainty does not extend to whether 
People V can demand that State R relinquish its neutrality and provide assistance. Since the eighteenth 
century, neutral states have never had positive duties to assist belligerents, much less the victims of 
armed conflict. Therefore, even a minimal conception of neutrality supports the view that states have a 
choice about intervention to help victims of humanitarian crimes. R2P purports to remove the choice, 
yet the laws of neutrality suggests further support for the idea that the responsibility to People V will 
be defined by State R, rather than by the needs of People V.  
                                                     
104 See Christopher Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modern International Law, 36 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 283, 305 (1987) 
(observing that the law of neutrality may set an upper limit to the rights of belligerents). 
105 See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 96 (1977) (4th ed 2006) (“Now, neutrality is conventionally regarded as 
an optative condition, a matter of choice, not of duty.”).  
The Choice to Protect: Rethinking Responsibility for Humanitarian Intervention 
31 
IV. A Choice to Protect 
Although proponents of R2P emphasize the abstract right of victims, states faced with serious 
violations of human rights in other states must decide whether to intervene, and if so, in what manner 
and to what extent. Whatever right People V have to be protected, State R will determine the 
obligations arising from those rights.  
This Part explains why the assertion of a responsibility to protect will turn on the judgment of each 
state called to fulfill the responsibility to victims in another state. First, the standards for responsibility 
are open-ended and broad and there are no agreed mechanisms for judging what responsibility exists 
in any particular case. The Security Council has not articulated consistent standards and it operates on 
a case-by-case basis. Similarly, even when states intervene on humanitarian grounds, as in Libya, they 
repeatedly state that their actions do not establish precedents for future interventions. Second, even if 
one accepts a general moral duty to protect, this responsibility includes a number of limitations that 
must be assessed by states, including inter alia, whether the crimes are serious and widespread enough 
to warrant intervention; what intervention might be proportionate; whether a state has sufficient 
capacity for intervention; and some grounds for believing that intervention will cause more good than 
harm. On its own terms, R2P turns on a number of practical contingencies that call for difficult state 
judgments. These practical assessments eclipse the asserted moral obligation by turning obligation into 
a pragmatic, consequentialist calculation by states. 
Assertion of responsibility has not changed the fact that ultimately intervention is a state’s choice. 
Even states that might be disposed to humanitarian intervention or to recognize a moral duty must 
judge the circumstances for themselves and their judgment will invariably turn on their particular 
assessments of the facts on the ground. 
A. Indeterminate scope of responsibility 
The responsibility to protect presents stark moral imperatives, but indeterminate standards and no 
reliable or consistent mechanism for defining responsibility in particular circumstances. The 
responsibility to protect people in other countries has been defined broadly as requiring the 
international community to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity.106 The 2005 World Summit Resolution commits to collective action, but 
only on a case-by-case basis. As Alex Bellamy has noted: “[O]nce states agree that something ought to 
be done, RtoP grants the international community a relatively free hand to determine what. This 
indeterminacy severely restricts RtoP’s compliance-pull, and hence its ability to encourage states to 
find consensus and commit additional resources to the protection of civilians.”107 The indeterminacy 
of the responsibility requires states to make individual assessments in the context of any particular 
humanitarian crisis. 
Proponents of R2P often suggest that the U.N. Security Council can articulate the specific 
responsibility of member states as threats to human security emerge.108 Yet they also recognize, as 
they must based on past experience, that the Security Council is at best unreliable in these matters and 
at worst a failure in the face of serious human rights violations.109 For example, the Security Council 
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sometimes fails to act. Over the past year the Security Council has repeatedly debated whether or not 
to issue a resolution concerning the events in Syria. Although over 9,000 people (at the time of this 
draft) have reportedly been killed by the government crackdown, for months China and Russia refused 
to allow a resolution, even one as anodyne as a statement condemning the attacks and calling for 
sanctions if the situation continues.110 Only recently did the Council approve a “supervision mission” 
to Syria of 300 unarmed military observers. In some circumstances, the Security Council issues 
resolution after resolution, with little ultimate effect, as with respect to the genocide and ethnic 
cleansing in Sudan. 
In other instances the Security Council has been unable to patrol the limits of its resolutions. In 
Libya, the Security Council Resolution called for a no-fly zone and protection of civilians. The 
NATO-led forces arguably went beyond the terms of the resolution in pursuing goals other than 
protection of civilians. Russia and China have cited the alleged over-extension of force in Libya to 
justify not taking action in Syria. In all of these instances—inaction, ineffective action, and 
unconstrained action—the Security Council resolutions ultimately prove incidental to the judgment 
and action of member states. 
Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that the Security Council cannot always lead or define with 
regard to the responsibility to protect. Kofi Annan has maintained that responsibility to protect must be 
kept under the provisions of the United Nations, but he admits that “in the toughest and most visible 
cases, when prevention fails and peaceful means are inadequate, it will be up to the Member States to 
prove their mettle as well as the value of the world body.”111 There is a practical component here—
only states have the capacity to engage in serious humanitarian interventions. R2P depends on strong 
states to preserve human security within and without their borders. But then, it must be recognized that 
states will judge for themselves whether circumstances exist that can justify the use of force for 
primarily humanitarian purposes and once they use force what the extent of engagement will be. 
Recognition that the Security Council often cannot provide international consensus or agreement on 
when the responsibility to protect is triggered further highlights how R2P depends primarily on 
individual state judgments. 
Quite by design, states have recognized some moral responsibility but prudently declined to specify 
the content or to bind themselves to a specific responsibility. In these circumstances, nations can 
recognize a standard of responsibility and yet still retain the authority to define what it means when 
confronted with specific human rights violations. They will interpret the responsibility depending on 
the context. They may do this in what others consider to be bad faith, manipulating the terms of 
responsibility to suit their own interests in interfering with another nation. Indeed, when nations state 
humanitarian reasons for intervention, they are often second-guessed and sometimes for good reason 
as with Russia’s intervention in Georgia.112 Disputes about whether asserted humanitarian 
interventions are truly humanitarian demonstrates the inevitability of widespread disagreement over 
what is properly included in this category. These disagreements often have more to do with politics 
than human rights.113 Even acting in good faith, however, nations will interpret the scope of the 
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responsibility differently based on how they perceive their duty in particular circumstances. The 
urgency of a humanitarian responsibility may depend on politics, national values, and global priorities 
more than on the particular harm to victims. 
B. Using military force and judging its conditions 
Although the responsibility to protect may be indeterminate, it undoubtedly raises serious moral 
questions with respect to how we value and protect human life. The impetus for R2P clearly reflects 
the imperative that someone should do something about widespread atrocities. Yet even taking the 
responsibility at face value, there are various conditions that must be satisfied before State R can use 
military force. These conditions require states to exercise individual judgment to fulfill the 
responsibility. Consider just some of the factors included as part of the decision to intervene in the 
ICISS Report and elsewhere: (1) intervention is only for “extreme and exceptional cases,” sometimes 
described as violence that shocks the conscience; (2) intervention must be a last resort; (3) the means 
used must be proportional and the minimum necessary for the humanitarian objective; and (4) 
intervention can be justified only if it has a reasonable chance of success. 
Each of these factors depends on states to make vital judgments about intervention. First, States 
must determine when responsibility is triggered, but what presents an extreme or exceptional case? 
Consider in this regard that last year Secretary of State Clinton has described the brutal crackdown in 
Syria as essentially “police actions which frankly have exceeded the use of force that any of us would 
want to see.”114 In recent months, Secretary Clinton has used much stronger language condemning the 
escalating violence. 
Second, assessing when intervention is a last resort raises difficult questions about what more can 
be done to halt a serious humanitarian crisis. Disputes may particularly arise when a state reasonably 
believes that killing of civilians is imminent. Preemptive action to protect individuals may be 
especially hard to determine with any certainty—and yet a state may conclude that there is sufficient 
evidence of imminent violence to justify intervention. President Obama used Qaddafi’s threat of 
imminent and widespread violence to justify America’s involvement—stressing that we had a 
responsibility to do something before more innocent people were massacred in Benghazi. Needless to 
say, many disagreed about the timing for action, the imminence of widespread violence, and whether 
other non-military steps should be taken first. 
Third, what constitutes proportional means for accomplishing the purpose of an intervention? In 
Libya did this include toppling Qaddafi? How far should the NATO-led forces have gone? These are 
evidently questions about which reasonable minds differ. It may be that for an intervention to succeed 
substantial resources will have to be committed—low-cost diplomatic interventions may not have 
much impact. But then to incur higher costs, governments must be able to predict with some certainty 
that intervention will result in substantial benefits.115 Today with the continuation of violence in Syria, 
what is the proportionate response? Many have argued that it is should be more than 300 U.N. 
observers. 
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The question of proportionality also relates to the specific means employed in intervention. R2P 
recognizes a continuium of responses, culminating with military force. States, however, will have to 
determine what they are willing to risk. Perhaps it will be monetary support in the form of aid and 
goods. Some military responses involve little risk of human life, such as the use of drones.  
Fourth, a state must act only when there is a reasonable prospect of success and intervention would 
not led to significant escalation and expansion of armed conflict. As discussed above, determining 
whether an armed intervention will promote human security or undermine it can be a difficult calculus 
of lives and resources. 
These are just some of the important limitations on the responsibility to protect. Each one 
requires a state to assess myriad factors and make complicated judgments in the face of uncertainty. 
The Security Council may at times resolve some of these questions, determining that conditions for 
intervention have been triggered or outlining what it views as the proportionate response to the harms. 
Yet ultimately the choice to intervene and the scope of military force will depend on states making 
these calculations. States will assess their moral obligations based on the particular context. 
Moreover, states must only intervene if they have the capacity to do so, or put another way, they 
can intervene without excessive costs on their own people. Although responsibility to other people is 
treated as a moral duty, because it is a positive obligation, nations cannot fulfill their responsibility 
unless they have financial and military capacity.116 Poor nations, or nations with few military 
resources, or strained resources, will not have the capacity to help victims in other nations. 
Accordingly, the scope of responsibility will vary not only on how nations assess all of the factors 
above, but also on the extent to which they have resources to intervene.  
The question of capacity is one that states must particularly determine for themselves. Consider 
that capacity in this context is necessarily a domestic political calculation, particularly for those 
wealthy states called upon to intervene. The assessment of capacity for the strongest and most capable 
states will be a relative one—intervene in Libya or another country; forego intervention and spend 
more money on social welfare programs or tax cuts. The question of capability and capacity turns on 
an internal judgment of each state and reinforces the idea that intervention remains a choice.  
These variables also highlight the importance of securing domestic legitimacy for interventions, for 
ensuring that moral claims of People V are weighed alongside all the other priorities of People R. As 
David Luban explains, “Once we acknowledge that it will be states that intervene, however, we must 
acknowledge as well that the domestic political process by which a state decides whether or not to 
commit its children and its fisc to war is relevant to just-war theory. The decision to intervene must be 
politically legitimate back home as well as morally legitimate abroad.”117 
Even assuming agreement on the basic principles of R2P, these principles include a number of 
factors that require difficult assessment by states contemplating intervention. In this context, it is 
hardly a surprise that states have insisted on determining the scope of responsibility to protect on a 
case-by-case basis. The moral duty does not get around the fact that intervention remains a choice of 
states. Given the limitations of R2P, states must judge whether the conditions are met and how the 
intervention should proceed from their own perspective. States will inevitably have to assess for 
themselves when and how to implement these standards.  
                                                     
116 See Lee Feinstein & Erica De Bruin, Beyond Words: U.S. Policy and the Responsibility to Protect, in RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT: THE GLOBAL MORAL COMPACT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 194 (Richard H. Cooper & Juliette Voinov Kohler, eds.) 
(2009) (“[A]greeing on the principle of the responsibility to protect is not the same thing as acting on it….The lack of 
actual capacity—diplomatic, military, and otherwise—reinforces political barriers to effective action.”). 
117 Luban, supra note , at 85. 
The Choice to Protect: Rethinking Responsibility for Humanitarian Intervention 
35 
V. Public choice: domestic processes and intervention  
Despite attempts to theorize R2P, humanitarian intervention remains a thorny practical problem, and 
the decision about whether or not to intervene does not ultimately turn on morality, but on the politics 
and practicalities of the situation. Anyone who doubts this should attempt to distinguish the violence 
in Libya from the violence in Syria. As discussed above, the responsibility to protect involves a state’s 
choice to assume responsibility and define its content.  
This Part examines how states make decisions about protecting individuals in other states by 
considering the domestic processes for making the legal and policy determinations leading to 
intervention. In particular, I look more closely at how the United States government makes decisions 
about intervention, using the recent intervention in Libya as an example. I focus on the United States 
in part because this is the government with which I am most familiar, but also because the United 
States is often the nation most capable and willing to intervene to halt atrocities.  
In addition, focusing on the processes in one nation provides an example for discussing 
disaggregation and bureaucratic conflict within a state. This is an area ripe for comparative work. 
Although each state will have its own bureaucratic difficulties, administration within the United States 
provides a starting point for considering the problem and I hope will encourage comparative work by 
those familiar with other state processes and administration. Conflict at the substate level and failures 
of coordination further support the conclusion that determinations about intervention will necessarily 
occur on a case-by-case basis that depends in part on how different agencies and departments of the 
government negotiate their assessments of responsibility in a particular situation.  
A. Bureaucratic disputes over international and domestic law 
As I have explained in an earlier article, executive branch agencies advising the President on matters 
of international law and policy often have different interests and incentives with regard to the proper 
course of action.118 Shaped by these interests and incentives, executive agencies frequently disagree 
about the requirements and application of international law and policy. Although the President serves 
as the unitary head of the executive branch, he must contend with agencies that often have very 
different perspectives about the desirability and feasibility of proposed diplomatic and military 
involvement.  
This dynamic has particular relevance for R2P, because decisions about humanitarian intervention 
require agencies to make a number of difficult legal and political assessments in areas of uncertainty. 
Agencies must assess questions of international law; but usually of greater urgency they must consider 
questions about domestic authority for the use of force. Liberal democracies usually have legal 
standards for the use of force as well as particular institutions and mechanisms for making decisions 
about the use of force. These standards and the mechanisms for determining them may be particularly 
contested in the context of humanitarian missions in which national interests may be attenuated. 
The decision by the United States to intervene in Libya provides an excellent example of this 
dynamic at work, particularly because of the leaks and reporting that allow for at least a partial 
glimpse of conflicts between executive branch agencies, including the Department of Justice, Defense 
Department, and State Department. These agencies disagreed about domestic legal authority as well as 
the political consequences of intervention.119 
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The key questions about the legality of intervention were domestic—whether the President could 
intervene in Libya without congressional authorization. The Department of Justice Office of Legal 
Counsel drafted a careful memorandum that reasoned congressional authorization was not required in 
certain very limited circumstances in which the United States involvement did not involve ground 
troops and had limited goals short of territorial occupation or conquest.120 Questions about whether 
President Obama should have obtained approval from Congress under the War Powers Resolution 
after the engagement had gone on for 60 days also presented difficulties. Here, it was reported that the 
Department of Justice pressed for the applicability of the Resolution, whereas the State Department 
determined that the actions in Libya did not constitute “hostilities” for the purposes of the War Powers 
Resolution.121 State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh’s legal gymnastics over this interpretation 
met with criticism from many fronts.122 Reports of disagreement between the President’s advisors 
served to undermine the authority of his legal claims.  
The President’s lawyers disagreed about the proper legal standards to be applied for the use of 
force in these circumstances. This had nothing to do with the scope of the “responsibility to protect” or 
international law. Rather, it had everything do with the requirements of domestic statutes and also the 
constitutional authority of the President to send the military on this type of mission. Ultimately the 
President made a decision not to seek congressional authorization, but the choice had political costs.  
In addition to legal conflicts, agencies may reasonably disagree about the politics of intervention. 
As explained above, the responsibility to protect requires states to make a number of determinations 
including whether the threats to human security are great enough; whether intervention has a 
reasonable chance of success; whether intervention will further human security overall; and whether 
the state has the capacity for intervention.123 Within a bureaucracy, each agency may reach different 
conclusions about the answers to these difficult questions. Agencies focus on issues from their 
particular perspectives, in light of their missions, and with what information they have available.124  
For example in the context of the Libya intervention, the State Department and the Defense 
Department disagreed about how to respond to the violence. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
publicly stated that intervention in Libya was not of “vital interest” to the United States.125 Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton supported the intervention early on when calls for a no-fly zone came from the 
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Arab world and England and France. Eventually Secretary Gates agreed that humanitarian crimes in 
Libya justified military action. But this “unity came only after a fraught internal debate, in which they 
and other senior officials had to weigh humanitarian values against national interests.”126 
The internal conflict and the ensuing conflict with Congress make it difficult to articulate a 
precedent for intervention. In addition, government actors officially reject any precedent from the 
Libya intervention. For example, Secretary Clinton strongly advocated intervention in Libya, but has 
repeatedly stated that Libya should not serve as a precedent for Syria.127 Her statements and those of 
other Administration officials openly express the importance of preserving flexibility to act on a case-
by-case basis. They also frustrate the development of R2P as an emerging norm of customary 
international law. 
Public choice explains why agency officials seek to retain discretion and maintain the ability to 
distinguish one humanitarian crisis from another. Depending on agency priorities and perspectives 
there may be substantial variation between agencies on questions about the need for intervention and 
its scope. The many variables for assessing intervention create a strong incentive for agency officials 
to maintain flexibility with regard to potential interventions. Agencies prefer flexibility for a number 
of reasons, including that it allows them to tailor their responses to particular circumstances. 
Moreover, agencies regularly compete for the attention of the White House and uncertainty in legal 
standards provides space for agencies to pursue different policy priorities. A precedent that hardened 
into specific criteria would remove the flexibility that reflects the long-term interest of agencies.  
The insistence on flexibility by agency officials mirrors the state’s interest in flexibility. States 
have sought to avoid the establishment of firm criteria for intervention and even those states 
recognizing some collective responsibility to protect have carefully limited it to case-by-case 
evaluations. Similarly, the Security Council, made of states that might be called to halt humanitarian 
disasters, has also been careful not to solidify precedents for humanitarian intervention. The reluctance 
to do so may stem in part from the difficulty of articulating such standards and in part because states 
have persistent political disagreements and would prefer to retain the discretion to object to any 
particular intervention.128 
These bureaucratic difficulties also make it difficult to predict whether any particular state will 
intervene on predominantly humanitarian grounds.129 Lack of predictability also makes it difficult to 
overcome collective action problems of finding a state that will intervene to halt humanitarian 
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disaster.130 If states and their respective agencies predict that other countries will take up the burden of 
intervention, they may choose to wait rather than incur the costs of immediate action.  
B. The Moral State 
As a doctrine and aspiration, responsibility to protect assumes that states will develop and act on moral 
obligation to victims in other states. Yet there is little consideration about whether states can behave as 
moral agents. Public choice analysis in the context of the United States demonstrates the difficulty of 
this assumption. The “they” of the executive branch makes it difficult for the state to behave as a 
moral agent. If humanitarian intervention can generate significant disputes with regard to the legal 
requirements of domestic law as well as political calculations about the costs and benefits of military 
action, identifying the scope and application of a moral responsibility to protect poses even greater 
difficulties. Many nations acknowledge the horrors of humanitarian crimes in the abstract or condemn 
such crimes as they occur. Yet when it comes to taking action against these horrors, the moral claims 
remain indeterminate—no one can say what is required in any humanitarian crisis. There is always a 
difficult balance of humanitarian claims, sovereign rights, and the casualties of armed conflict—not to 
mention complicated domestic and geopolitical interests. The indeterminacy of moral obligation has 
several consequences for humanitarian intervention.  
First, only a strong chief executive will be able to recognize and act upon the duty. In the United 
States, this requires the President to make an appeal to the people and Congress about the importance 
of such intervention. The President will gauge national commitment to a particular humanitarian issue; 
or use his office to raise awareness of a particular conflict. It requires the President to direct his 
disparate agencies to work together to avert humanitarian disaster using all available tools, such as 
diplomacy and aid, and as a last resort, military force. For example, in the Libya context, on February 
25, 2011, President Obama’s first official action was to issue an Executive Order imposing economic 
sanctions on Qaddafi, his government and his close associates.131 The Executive Order imposed a 
freeze on assets of the Government of Libya in the United States. The State Department revoked visas 
held by these officials and others responsible for human rights violations in Libya. This was a month 
before the President directed the military to help establish a no-fly zone and protect civilians in Libya. 
The President has to make the moral case, connecting intervention with our national interests, with 
our sense of moral obligation, to explain why financial and human resources should be used to halt 
atrocities in other countries. If the President does not take a strong interest in the intervention, it is 
difficult to pinpoint another location for the moral responsibility. Executive branch agencies are 
generally not designed to assume moral duties. Rather they have a variety of constituencies, including 
congressional committees, outside groups, and the White House. Agencies must act in a way that 
satisfies these constituencies. Starting from the top, if the White House has little interest in a 
humanitarian crisis, agencies may not wish to use their political capital to push the issue. Agencies 
have limited political and financial resources to devote to their projects and may not want to devote 
those resources to moral causes without widespread support. 
Agencies have different goals and missions and they interpret legal requirements and political 
consequences of intervention in light of their particular interests. Because of conflicting assessments, 
agencies often find themselves in competition with other agencies for control over foreign 
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policymaking.132 The White House often finds it difficult to coordinate such differences and indeed, it 
may be the case that such differences benefit the President in some respects.133 Yet persistent 
differences of opinion and lack of consistent coordination make it especially difficult to envision 
agencies adopting a consistent moral position on humanitarian intervention. Rather, agencies will 
tailor their advice to suit the particular constellation of interests involved in any given circumstance. 
Even the State Department, which often speaks of international law in terms of “conscience” and 
supports development of international human rights, has not committed to any clear standards of 
responsibility to protect people in other states and regularly reaffirms that intervention in one place 
does not become a requirement for intervention in others.  
Another focus of moral obligation might be Congress. Could Congress lead on humanitarian 
intervention if the President fails to do so? Congress cannot order in the troops, but it can indicate its 
support for military action through the authorization of force and appropriations for the use of force. 
Members and committees can exhort the President to action or create pressure through actions short of 
the use of force—imposing sanctions, increasing humanitarian aid, etc. Yet 535 Members of Congress 
lack the institutional capacity for easily directing the nation’s moral action, and of course, they cannot 
call out the troops (or drones). Without Presidential leadership legislative exhortations are likely to be 
of limited effect. Moreover, getting a majority of both houses of Congress to support humanitarian 
intervention through legislative action often proves difficult. This is in part because Congress would 
prefer the President to make and be responsible for decisions to use military force. President Obama 
did not seek approval for the Libya intervention in part because he was informed that Congress would 
not authorize the intervention.  
* * * 
Serious humanitarian crimes continue to occur in places like Sudan and Syria. Responsibility to 
protect suggests when a country terrorizes its own citizens and even when a country is powerless to 
prevent mass killings within its borders that other states have a duty to respond. This Essay has sought 
to show that although the victims of these crimes have an urgent need for assistance, the need does not 
define the assistance. Instead states contemplating intervention will define the scope and extent of the 
protection provided. This is not to underestimate the seriousness of the harm or the desirability of 
intervention in certain circumstances, only that nothing in international law or R2P has established a 
responsibility of states to assist.  
An honest assessment of the positive claims of the victims of humanitarian crimes suggests that the 
decision of whether to intervene, how, and with what force, will remain a choice of states. The 
reluctance of states to commit to intervention in other states and the reluctance to treat interventions as 
precedents for other situations has emphasized the unique circumstances of each humanitarian crisis. 
The unique circumstances, however, rarely turn on an assessment of the harm to individuals, but 
instead depend on domestic and international politics, feasibility, and will. Case-by-case determination 
suggests that whatever moral obligation may exist is a highly contingent one, driven not only (or even 
primarily) by the harms to persons, but rather by the particular interests, politics, and capabilities of 
states called to intervene. Abstract obligations of R2P have not changed these realities. Responsibility 
for human security continues to depend, in some places perilously, on states protecting their own 
people. Proponents of responsibility to protect between states need to find a firmer foundation for this 
wider responsibility.  
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